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Abstract—Software security is known to be a primary bottleneck 
in web-based software system. This paper describes how the 
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model can be applied to a 
road transport management system and demonstrates the design 
and implementation of the RBAC model in detail. In addition, a 
time limit and trust degree decreasing delegate authorization 
model is also proposed in order to give support to task allocation 
in the domain of time and to enhance the efficiency of 
cooperation between different departments and extraction of 
data. This design enables the system to be secure, reliable and 
convenient in daily use and it has been running stably and 
effectively for some time. It shows that the above design ensure 
security of the system and flexibility of authority management 
and meet current security standards in open environment.  
Keywords- Road Transport Management; RBAC; Delegation 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Access control is an important method to ensure security of 
a software system. It indicates what operations one can do and 
what one can’t do. The goal of access control is to prevent any 
unauthorized access to system resources (such as computing 
resources, communication resources or information resources). 
Among all the access models, Role Based Access Control 
(RBAC) is the most influential one, which has become a 
general method in this area[1,2]. Compared to any other access 
control models, RBAC model can not only simplify the 
strategy set, reduce the cost of authority management, but also 
can support the authorization constraints effectively. 
The Road Transport Management System (RTMS) is based 
on the B/S(Brower/Server) structure which integrates services 
of freight transport, passenger transport and taxi service. The 
system includes three different kinds of tasks, every task needs 
collaborative work among different departments. The most 
challenging task is how higher level departments grant 
authority to lower level counterparts. Similar to most software 
systems, this system has potential security problems, especially 
in the authority management. Lack of consideration for system 
security will lead to dangerous unauthorized operation and 
make it hard to apply the system to open environment [3-5]. 
After intensive study of the Chinese Ministry of 
Transportation standard documents, we develop an integrated 
system including freight subsystem, passenger subsystem and 
taxi subsystem and we successfully apply RBAC model in it. 
Furthermore, we introduce a time limit and trust degree 
decreasing delegation authorization model in the domain of 
time in order to strengthen the safety control. The introduction 
of modern access control model and collaboration mechanism 
enables the system to become a successful case of applying 
RBAC model into an actual software application system. 
II. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF RTMS  
Road transport includes freight transport, passenger 
transport and taxi services. The end users of the system are 
scattered in three level departments: transport stations of all 
districts of the city, city service center and city transport 
bureau. Also includes some staff in taxi affiliated companies. 
Safety challenge of the system described as follows: 
(1) Operation rights access control. A task can’t be 
accomplished by a single department, but involves three 
different levels departments: management stations scatter in 
different district of the city, city service center and city 
transport bureau. So we have to control the operation rights 
authorization respectively. 
(2) Sensitive data access control. Some tasks are quite 
special and we name them sensitive tasks because such tasks 
need to obtain permission from the relevant departments’ 
leader. It is necessary to refine the authority control on these 
sensitive operations. For example, if the task is modifying the 
unique identification number of a vehicle or a vehicle owner’s 
ID number, higher level authorization is needed because we 
have to record the responsible person who performs this 
operation.  
(3) Business scope access control. Some staff’s operation 
types are the same, but the processing of their operation are 
different. For instance, when business scope goes to issuing 
freight vehicle license for dangerous goods transport or create 
freight station, it need to be issued by the city transport bureau 
director---the highest authority. However, for other business 
scope, issuing tasks can be approved by lower level 
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 departments. Therefore, for some special operation we need to 
control its access rights according to the business scope it 
belongs to. 
Due to the total number of tasks in RTMS are quite large---
---nearly over one hundred items, authority maintenance 
workload is relatively tremendous. To solve the above 
problem, we need to use RBAC to reduce the intensive 
maintenance workload, and to produce delegate authorization 
mechanism to achieve grant rights, so as to ensure the security 
of the tasks and the data.  
III. THE ANALYSIS AND DESIGN OF ACCESS 
CONTROL FRAMEWORK  
A. CORE RBAC 
 
We deploy core RBAC frame of ANSI RBAC to RTMS 
because it is more practical to apply it to applications. Core 
RBAC defines almost all the objects and their relations that 
basic RBAC should have, as shown in Figure 1.  
Figure 1.  Core RBAC 
Core RBAC defines three basic sets, including the set of 
roles, permissions and users. It is the role not the user who gets 
permissions. It creates a level of indirections between users and 
permissions through roles. Sessions are the platform for a user 
to get a role (roles), so sessions are the methods that a user be 
transferred to a role.  
B. Design of RBAC Framework  
In this paper, we design and improve the mapping and 
storage from the operating permissions to the roles. Permission 
itself is the same with the definition in core RBAC. The 
permission-role assignments have three types: the first one is 
Boolean, indicates whether or not a role has a specific 
permission; The second one is Numerical , shows to what 
degree a role owns a permission; And the third is Mixed, 
including multiple permissions. 
There are four categories of objects in RTMS, including 
vehicles, owners, operators and business scope. The most 
important property of a vehicle is the district it belongs to(For 
example: District A or District B of a city) and its service type. 
For users we focus on the districts they belong to. For a 
operator we need to know the department he (she) works for. 
Business scope may need to focus for the rights to granting 
permissions to perform certain tasks. 
For a role, operation permission is the start point of a task. 
Because a lot of tasks are quite similar, we design a uniform 
function for them. When we assign certain permission to a role 
we just modify parameters of the function. Therefore the 
process of creating a role is the instantiation of a specific task. 
C. Analysis and design of a time and trust-degree-threshold 
based delegate authorization model  
Delegation is an important security policy, its basic idea is 
that a user gives some or all of  its permissions to other users, 
let the receiving authorized users instead of himself (herself) to 
perform certain tasks. 
Roles once defined, with relative stability, like the 
enterprise or the company's management system once formed, 
will not randomly change relevant responsibilities. So when a 
role does not have the appropriate permissions but need to 
perform certain operations, delegation will be used[6]. Usually 
it happens in the following cases: 
(1) In case of a user A goes on a business trip or gets ill, in 
order to continue carrying out his (her)responsibility of the 
work, delegation need to give his access rights to others. When 
user A returns, permissions should be returned to him(her). 
(2) If user A could have some access rights in certain 
period of time or certain time point depends on if user B ‘s 
delegation is valid. 
(3) In some cases, different groups of users need to work 
together and accomplish one task. Some members of a team 
have to be assigned certain access rights in order to work 
together smoothly. 
As can be seen from (1), delegation is always temporary 
because the expiration date of delegation is limited, the number 
of use is limited, and it must happen on a certain point. From 
(2) we can infer that delegation is time sequence dependent. 
For example, a temporary access right, allowing operating only 
once, but authorization for the object is two users A and B. If 
user A has used the access right, then this access right is no 
longer valid and it can’t be use by user B. From (3) as you can 
see, the master role tends to expand the access permissions. If 
granting rights are given to user A , then A may authorize these 
access rights to other users. Thus from the perspective of the 
user A, with the increase of entrust depth, a object is more and 
more far away from authorized source and the credible degree 
is lower and lower. Therefore, we should control entrust depth. 
The essence of delegation is that some users who own the 
grant privilege do approval operating on some specific tasks.  
Approval in the system includes designating agents, regulating 
valid time, specifying a service object and service type. An 
authorized user is entitled to execute certain operation on some 
specific objects after login during some specific period of time. 
Some special tasks such as modifying vehicle information 
and road transport license need restrictions. A car, for example, 
in the final gets its license after going through all kinds of 
formalities from four departments. The process is the result of 
all the four departments’ jointly permission. So data is needed 
to be changed, it is necessary to seek approval from all the four 
departments, otherwise it is likely to cause confusion among 
 vehicle data, there is no guarantee for the normal management 
order. 
In normal task process, relevant formalities are needed to 
ensure the legitimacy of the process. To modify the data of a 
vehicle, an application should be submitted first, then modify 
data after getting permissions. 
For vehicles which have got licenses, modifying their 
technical parameters and identification information means 
there are mistakes. It is an abnormal status no matter from 
which layer error come. In such situation, permissions are 
demanded if willing to continue the process, so as to ensure the 
process nationally and logically.  
In addition, overlarge or overweight vehicles are all unable 
to get normal maintenance data like regular vehicles. So in 
such case delegate authorization is also needed. After all, 
maintenance data of such vehicle belong to the exception, so 
getting special permissions to carry on the process conforms to 
normal management process. 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF ACCESS CONTROL AND 
DELEGATION AUTHORIZATION MODEL  
A. Implementation of RBAC 
The core of the RBAC design is the definition of the set of 
roles. In RTMS, the definition of the role is in accordance with 
its departments. Firstly, the level of department is considered. 
There are three levels of departments: Transport Stations 
scatted in all the districts of the city (TS), City Service Centre 
(CSC) and City Transport Bureau (CTB). Each TS is lower 
than CSC, CSC is below the CTB. From requirement analysis, 
we can put most access rights in CSC and CTS only manages 
some sensitive permissions. According to different districts and 
different service types we design the roles as follows: District 
A Freight Operator, District B Taxi Operator and so on. We 
can know their job responsibility even from the name of the 
role. So we design the role layer scheme as shown in Figure 2.  
In Figure 2, vehicle service type, delegate authorization and 
districts property are affiliated permissions. There are unable to 
be allocated to roles without specific tasks in detail. 
We create 7 roles, including District A Freight Operator, 
District B Passenger Operator, District C Taxi Operator, 
Passenger Director, Freight Director, Taxi Director and Service 
Agent. 
B. Analysis and design of a time and trust degree threshold 
based delegation model   
1) Modeling 
RT0 is a model for describing delegation between entities, 
mainly in the distributed environment. But it has some 
limitations, which is unable to control depth and valid time 
length of the delegation. Subsequent versions of RT0 made a 
lot of great improvements but still has not solve the two main 
problems of it. Unfortunately the two main problems are 
exactly what we most frequently used in daily management 
work. Some articles propose role compatible models for 
delegation, but the delegation granularity is still too coarse 
which is still not suited for delegation with property 
assignment. This paper expands RT0 to a delegation 
authorization model with a trust degree threshold and time 
limitation. 
Figure 2.  Role Layer Scheme 
 Definition 1 (Trust degree, Trust Degree Threshold, Trust 
Degree Threshold Attenuation Coefficient): TS for set of trust 
set, TMS for set of trust degree threshold, TLS = TTS = [0, 1]. 
Any t ∈ TS, if t = 1 indicates that the entity is fully credible; T 
= 0 means the entity is not to be trusted.TRS = [0, 1] is 
definition domain for trust degree attenuation coefficient. 
Definition 2 (Time Limit): binary relation tl=(ts,te) is a time 
limit relation, ts is the starting time, te is the  finish time , ts≤
te. te could be ∞, indicate there is no finish time. 
LS={tl1,tl2,…,tln} show set of time limit. For tl∈LS,  tl is 
valid if and only if the current time tcur meet ts≤tcur≤te. 
valid(tl) is the function to test and verify if tl is valid, return 1 
when tl is valid, otherwise return 0. 
Definition 3 (Role/Permission assignment with trust degree 
threshold and time limit): Role/Permission assignment with 
trust degree threshold and time limit is 
PAT⊆ROLES×PRMS×TMS×LS. Set (r,p,t,tl)∈PAT, so an 
entity with trust degree t’(t’≥t) may apply permission p when 
it get role r with a valid tl. Trust degree threshold value and 
time limit is constraints for the use of permissions. 
 Definition 3 describes how to assign permission to a role, 
especially when many entities own the same role. When 
delegate and give access right to a single user, we can create an 
agent role, then make the delegation to the agent, finally assign 
that role to the user. 
Definition 4 (Trust degree threshold attenuation table on 
role layer): DCS⊆{DRH×TDCS} shows a relationship set 
made up of direct inheritance relationship and trust degree 
threshold attenuation coefficient relationship set. TDCS 
expresses the set of trust degree threshold attenuation 
coefficient. If role r assign permission p to r1,   that is  
((r1,r),dcs)∈DCS∧(r,p,t,tl)∈PAT.  The trust degree to p of r1 
is dcs*t*valid(tl). 
Definition 5 (Trust degree threshold attenuation function in 
role layer): The attenuation coefficient function for direct 
inheritance relationship is fGetDcsValue(drh:DRH). The 
attenuation coefficient function for indirect inheritance 
relationship is fGetComDcsValue(l:RH)。 
We can infer easily (drh,fGetDcsValue(drh)) ∈ DCS. 
Suppose r and r’ are roles not having inheritance relationship, 
l=(r,r’) ∈ RH, then the coefficient value from 
fGetComDcsValue(l) function  is the minimum multiple 
multiply result of the path among them. 
2) Implementation of delegate authorization 
At the same time delegation authorization is finished, a 
trust degree threshold attenuation path is also formed. After 
activated a role is requesting for permission, the system will 
check the authorization certificate. Under the initial state, initial 
value is 1, accumulate attenuation coefficient in every 
certificate, so as to get a trust degree value, circulating until no 
delegation certificate left. Compare trust degree value with 
permissions confidence threshold value. If the trust degree 
value is greater than or equal to the corresponding threshold, 
the request permission license its performance; if less than the 
threshold, refused to authorize. Role authorization table is as 
shown in TABLE 1. 
TABLE I.  ROLE-PERMISSION ALLOCATION TABLE 
Name of Role Permissions Threshold 
District   A 
freight operator 
Freight operating 
permissions  0.8 
District  B 
 Passenger operator 
Passenger operating 
permissions  0.8 
District C  
Taxi operator 
Taxi operating 
permissions  0.8 
Passenger director Delegation permissions  0.9 
Passenger director District  property  0.7 
Freight director Delegation permissions  0.9 
Freight director District  property  0.7 
Taxi director Delegation permissions  0.9 
Taxi director District property  0.7 
 
Figure 3 shows a simple direct inheritance relationship of 
some roles. Each arrow indicates directly inheritance 
relationship. The weights on the arrow show trust degree 
attenuation coefficient. For example, taxi director delegates 
rights to a District A freight operator, the coefficient is 0.8, 
other routes are same meaning. Setting principle for attenuation 
coefficient is: having direct inheritance relationship with the 
directors decays relatively small, the operator is relatively large. 
Because we believe that in a department senior managers 
compared with the ordinary staff has a higher degree of 
confidence. 
Figure 3.  Trust-Degree Threshold Attenuation Relationship 
According to the attenuation function in definition 5, if the 
agent role get operation permissions from District A freight 
operator, the trust degree value is minimum, which is 1* 0.8 
*0.5 = 0.4, less than threshold 0.8, so the agent role owning 
authorization is not credible, thus realize the restrictions on 
terminal operator’s ability to assign permissions outward. If the 
agent role gets operation permissions from taxi director, the 
trust degree value should be 1*0.95 = 0.95 which is greater 
than the threshold value of 0.8, so to be believed. Trust 
attenuation relations also need initialization and maintenance 
work; the system administrator can adjust it according to the 
actual situation.  
V. CONCLUSIONS   
In this paper, we discuss the security problems in RTMS in 
detail. In order to guarantee safe access control to the system, 
we propose an access control model, set up its framework and 
add a time and trust-degree threshold delegation authorization 
model. With these design, management for the access right is 
more flexible, safer. Furthermore, sensitive data is managed 
very well.  
 Practice show that the above design ensures the system 
running smoothly and effectively for a long time. RTMS is 
quite import for regular running of the city transport market 
and the management effective  the stability of the urban road 
transportation market order, improve the efficiency of 
transportation management department management play a 
positive role. And for the widely application of RBAC model 
provides a valuable reference of reality. 
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